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Abstract
We study the Gaussian MIMOME wiretap channel where a transmitter wishes to communicate a confidential
message to a legitimate receiver in the presence of eavesdroppers, while the eavesdroppers should not be able
to decode the confidential message. Each node in the network is equipped with arbitrary number of antennas.
Furthermore, channels are time varying, and there is no channel state information available at the transmitter (CSIT)
with respect to eavesdroppers’ channels; and transmitter only has access to delayed CSIT of the channel to the
legitimate receiver. The secure degrees of freedom (SDoF) for such network has only been characterized for special
cases, and is unknown in general. We completely characterize the SDoF of this network for all antenna configurations.
In particular, we strictly improve the state-of-the-art achievable scheme for this network by proposing more efficient
artificial noise alignment at the receivers. Furthermore, we develop a tight upper bound by utilizing 4 important
inequalities that provide lower bounds on the received signal dimensions at receivers which supply delayed CSIT or
no CSIT, or at a collection of receivers where some supply no CSIT. These inequalities together allow for analysis
of signal dimensions in networks with asymmetric CSIT; and as a result, we present a converse proof that leads to
characterization of SDoF for all possible antenna configurations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wiretap channel is one of the canonical settings in the information-theoretic study of secrecy in wireless networks.
It consists of a transmitter that wishes to communicate a secret message to a legitimate receiver in the presence of
eavesdropper(s) that should not decode the confidential message. There has been a large amount of work on this
problem, and its secrecy capacity has been determined in several configurations (e.g., [3]–[6]). In particular, the
secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel is characterized in [6], and it is known that if the channel to the
legitimate receiver is “less noisy” than the channel to the eavesdropper, then a positive rate of secret communication
is achievable.
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2However, the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel does not scale with the available transmit power,
i.e., the secure degrees of freedom (SDoF) of Gaussian wiretap channel is zero. This has motivated the utilization
of helping jammers and multi-antenna transmitters in networks to increase the achievable SDoF (e.g. [7]–[17]). In
particular, it has been shown in [10] that the SDoF of wiretap channel with a helping jammer (i.e. cooperative
jamming) in a wireless setting in which the channels remain constant is 12 . This work has also been extended in [11]
to the case that transmitters have no knowledge of channels to the eavesdropper (i.e., blind cooperative jamming),
and it has been shown that even if transmitters have no eavesdropper channel state information at the transmitter
(CSIT), the same SDoF can be achieved. Furthermore, the SDoF of four fundamental one-hop wireless networks has
been studied in [10]: Gaussian wiretap channel, Gaussian broadcast channel with confidential messages, Gaussian
interference channel with confidential messages, and Gaussian multiple access wiretap channel. They have provided
achievability results based on Real Interference Alignment. However, the above results rely on the assumption that
channels are constant, and do not change over time.
Secure communication over networks with time-varying channels (i.e. ergodic channels) has been considered
in some prior works in the literature [18]–[22]. In particular, in [18], achievability results for secure degrees of
freedom of K-user interference channel with instantaneous channel state information at the transmitters (CSIT)
were presented. Moreover, SDoF of wireless X networks has been studied in [19]. Nevertheless, the results in these
works heavily rely on the assumption that the transmitters have perfect and instantaneous access to the channel
state information, which is not realistic in scenarios where channel coherence time is very small; because by the
time that channel state information is fed back to the transmitter, the channel coefficients have already changed.
Therefore, there have been follow up works that focus on studying SDoF for settings in which only delayed CSIT
is available. In particular, in [20] Yang et al. have considered the Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel with delayed
CSIT; and they have characterized the SDoF of such network for arbitrary number of antennas. However, they
assume that the eavesdropper supplies the transmitter with perfect delayed CSIT, which in most scenarios is not
a realistic assumption. For the case where no eavesdropper CSIT is available, [20] provides lower bounds on the
SDoF which only match their respective upper bounds for specific network configurations, and the SDoF is in
general unknown.
In this work, we focus on the time-varying wiretap channel in which channels are changing over time; and we
consider a multi-antenna transmitter with a multi-antenna legitimate receiver, and arbitrary number of eavesdroppers,
each equipped with multiple antennas (MIMOME wiretap channel). The transmitter is blind with respect to the
state of channels to the eavesdroppers, and only has access to delayed channel state information (CSIT) of the
legitimate receiver. We consider the case where all nodes in the network are potentially equipped with multiple
antennas, which is referred to as “blind MIMOME wiretap channel with delayed CSIT”.
For blind MIMOME wiretap channel with delayed CSIT, SDoF has only been previously characterized for the
special case where the number of transmit antennas is less than either the legitimate receiver or an eavesdropper
[20]. For such case, a single-phase achievable scheme can achieve the SDoF, during which the transmitter sends
3a number of artificial noise symbols, equal to the number of antennas at the largest eavesdropper, and some
information symbols in each time slot. However, SDoF is unsolved for other cases. In particular, the lower bounds
on SDoF derived in the literature for the general case do not match the existing upper bounds, which also hold for
the setting in which eavesdroppers supply delayed CSIT [20]. In this paper, we completely characterize the SDoF
for blind MIMOME wiretap channel with delayed CSIT for all antenna configurations. In particular, we improve
the state-of-the-art achievable schemes; and we provide tight upper bounds on the SDoF which capture the impact
of having no eavesdropper CSIT on secure communications.
In our proposed achievable scheme the transmitter transmits artificial noise symbols in order to perform two
tasks simultaneously: first, the artificial noise signals span the entire received signal space at the eavesdroppers to
completely drown the confidential message in noise at the eavesdroppers. Second, artificial noise signals are aligned
into a smaller linear subspace at the legitimate receiver in order to occupy less signal dimensions and leave some
room for the confidential message to be decoded.1 Our achievable scheme performs these two tasks by utilizing
the delayed CSIT provided by the legitimate receiver in a two-phase transmission scheme. For settings in which
the legitimate receiver has less antennas than an eavesdropper, our proposed achievable scheme allows for more
efficient artificial noise alignment at the eavesdroppers by spending less artificial noise equations for retransmission,
hence improving the achieved SDoF.
The converse proof is based on 4 main lemmas. Each lemma presents an inequality which provides a lower
bound on the received signal dimension at a receiver which supplies a certain type of CSIT. These inequalities
provide the essential tools for analyzing the received signal dimensions at different receivers in blind MIMOME
wiretap channel with delayed CSIT. In particular, Least Alignment Lemma, which generalizes the result in [23]
to the MIMO setting, states that if two receivers in a network have the same number of antennas and one of the
receivers supplies no CSIT, the least amount of alignment will occur at that receiver, meaning that transmit signals
will occupy the maximal signal dimensions at that receiver.
Moreover, Lemma 2 and Lemma 4 provide lower bounds on the received signal dimensions at receivers which
supply delayed and no CSIT, respectively. Finally, Lemma 5 provides a lower bound on the received signal
dimensions at a collection of receivers, where some receivers supply no CSIT. The intuition behind the converse
proof has been obtained by analyzing linear signal dimensions when transmitter is employing linear encoding
schemes [2]. The techniques used in the converse proof allow for a better understanding of the fundamental trade-
offs between the signal dimensions received at different receivers in networks with heterogeneous CSIT, where
different receivers supply different types of CSIT.
Notation. We use small letters (e.g. x) for scalars, arrowed letters (e.g. ~x) for vectors, capital letters (e.g. X)
for matrices, and calligraphic font (e.g. X ) for sets. For any scalar variable x we use [x]+ to denote max(x, 0).
Moreover, for a random vector ~x, we denote its covariance matrix by K~x. Landau notation x(n) = o(n) is used to
1Artificial noise Alignment was introduced in [9] to mask the confidential message in the artificial noise at the undesired receivers.
4denote limn→∞
x(n)
n = 0. We use det[A] to denote determinant of matrix A; and A
H denotes Hermitian transpose
of matrix A. Im denotes the identity matrix of size m×m; and A⊗B denotes the Kronecker product of matrices
A,B. [x1;x2; . . . ;xn] denotes a n× 1 vector with the i-th element being xi.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND MAIN RESULTS
We consider the Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output multiple-eavesdropper (MIMOME) wiretap channel
depicted in Figure 1, which consists of a transmitter (Tx) equipped with m antennas and k+ 1 receivers Rx1,Rx2,
. . . ,Rxk+1, where Rxi (i = 1, . . . , k + 1) is equipped with ni antennas (m,n1, . . . , nk+1 ∈ N). Throughout the
paper we denote the maximum of n2, . . . , nk+1 by nmax, and the corresponding receiver by Rxmax. In other words,
Rxmax is the eavesdropper with the most number of antennas (nmax antennas).2 Tx has a secret message for Rx1
(legitimate receiver), while Rx2, . . . ,Rxk+1 are eavesdroppers.
𝐑𝐱𝟏 
𝐑𝐱𝟐 
𝐓𝐱 
(Legitimate Receiver) 
(Eavesdropper) 
m antennas 
n1 antennas 
n2 antennas 
𝐑𝐱𝑲+𝟏 
(Eavesdropper) 
nk+1 antennas 
𝑔1(𝑡) 
𝑔2(𝑡) 
𝑔𝑘+1(𝑡) 
Fig. 1. Network configuration for the blind MIMOME wiretap channel with k eavesdroppers, where Rx2, . . . ,Rxk+1 do not supply any
CSIT, and Rx1 only supplies delayed CSIT.
The received signal at Rxj (j ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1}) at time t is given by
~yj(t) = gj(t)~x(t) + ~zj(t), (1)
where ~x(t) ∈ Cm is the transmit signal vector of Tx; gj(t) ∈ Cnj×m indicates the channel matrix from Tx to
Rxj ; and ~zj(t) ∼ CN (0, Inj ). The channel coefficients comprising the channel matrix gj(t) are i.i.d, and also i.i.d.
across time, antennas, and receivers, and they are drawn from a continuous distribution, where the absolute value
of each element of gj(t) is bounded by a large number dmax. We denote by G(t) , {g1(t), . . . , gk+1(t)} the set
of all channel coefficients at time t. In addition, we denote by Gn the set of all channel coefficients from time 1
to n, i.e.,
Gn , {gj(t) : j ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1}, t ∈ {1, . . . , n}}.
2If there are multiple eavesdroppers with nmax antennas, we consider the eavesdropper with smallest index to be Rxmax.
5Moreover, we use the following notation throughout the paper:
~xt ,

~x(1)
...
~x(t)
 , ~ytj ,

~yj(1)
...
~yj(t)
 , ~ztj ,

~zj(1)
...
~zj(t)
 , Gtj , diag(Gj(1), . . . , Gj(t)),
where diag(Gj(1), . . . , Gj(t)) is the block diagonal matrix which has Gj(1), . . . , Gj(t) on its diagonal. Similarly,
~xt0:t1 ,

~x(t0)
...
~x(t1)
 , ~yt0:t1j ,

~yj(t0)
...
~yj(t1)
 , ~zt0:t1j ,

~zj(t0)
...
~zj(t1)
 , Gt0:t1j , diag(Gj(t0), . . . , Gj(t1)).
The transmitter obeys an average power constraint, 1nE{||~xn||2} ≤ p. We assume delayed channel state informa-
tion at the transmitter (CSIT) with respect to the channel to the legitimate receiver (Rx1); however, the transmitter
does not have knowledge of the channels to the eavesdroppers. In other words, at time t, only Gt−11 is known
precisely to the transmitter; and the transmitter only knows a probability distribution for values of the channels to
the eavesdroppers, where we denote the maximum value of such distribution by fmax, where fmax = o(log p).
Definition 1. A code for a communication block length of n for the blind MIMOME wiretap channel with delayed
CSIT consists of:
• A sequence of encoders, f (n) = (f (n)1 , . . . , f
(n)
n ), where at time t,
~x(t) = f
(n)
t (W,G1
t−1),
where message W is uniformly distributed over {1, 2, . . . , |W(n)|}.
• The corresponding decoder F (n) at Rx1, where
Wˆ = F (n)(~yn1 ,Gn).
• The error probability of communication is defined to be
p(n)e = Pr(W 6= Wˆ ).
Based on the above definition, we now define the secure degrees of freedom (SDoF) of the blind MIMOME
wiretap channel with delayed CSIT.
Definition 2. d secure degrees of freedom are achievable if there exists a sequence of encoders and decoders
{f (n), F (n)}∞n=1, such that
lim sup
n→∞
p(n)e = 0, (2)
and
lim inf
p→∞ lim infn→∞
log |W(n)|
n log p
≥ d, (3)
6and Equivocation condition is satisfied:
lim sup
p→∞
lim sup
n→∞
I(W ; ~ynj )
n log p
= 0, 2 ≤ j ≤ k + 1. (4)
We define D to be the convex closure of the set of all achievable d’s. We also define secure degrees of freedom
(SDoF) to be the supremum of all d ∈ D.
Remark 1. Equivocation condition in (4) means that the prelog factor of the equivocation rate to eavesdroppers
should vanish as n → ∞. The Equivocation condition (4) is weaker than the condition lim supn→∞ I(W ;~y
n
j )
n =
0, 2 ≤ j ≤ k+1, considered in some prior works including [24], [25]. However, one can combine our achievable
schemes presented in Section III for blind MIMOME wiretap channel with delayed CSIT with random binning [3]
to satisfy the latter condition as well.
For the problem of blind MIMOME wiretap channel with delayed CSIT, Yang et al. [20] have characterized
SDoF for the special case where one of the receivers has more antennas than the transmitter. However, SDoF is in
general unknown, and [20] only provides lower bounds on SDoF for the general case.
The main result of this paper is the following theorem, which completely characterizes SDoF for blind MIMOME
wiretap channel with delayed CSIT for all antenna configurations by improving the best known achievable schemes
and providing tight upper bounds.
Theorem 1. For the blind MIMOME wiretap channel with delayed CSIT, let m¯ = min(m,n1 + nmax) and
n¯ = min(n1, nmax). Then, SDoF is characterized as follows:
SDoF =
{
[m− nmax]+ if m ≤ max(n1, nmax)
n1(m¯−nmax)
m¯−nmax+n¯ if m > max(n1, nmax).
(5)
Note that the SDoF of blind MIMOME wiretap channel with delayed CSIT does not decrease with increasing
the number of eavesdroppers; rather, SDoF is only a function of nmax, the maximum number of antennas on a
single eavesdropper. As a special case, Theorem 1 implies that the achievable scheme presented in [26] for blind
MISO wiretap channel with delayed CSIT, which achieves 12 , is indeed optimal.
3
In order to better understand how the result compares with prior works from the achievability perspective, Table I
presents two classes of antenna configurations for which our results strictly improve the existing achievable schemes.
In particular, the table provides an example for each case, and states the achieved secure degrees of freedom by
both [20] and Theorem 1. Thus, Theorem 1 strictly improves the existing achievable schemes in cases such as
n1 ≤ nmax < m ≤ n1 + nmax, and m ≥ n1 + nmax, where nmax > n1. Moreover, as we will see in Section III,
we provide a single unified achievable scheme for all antenna configurations which satisfy max(n1, nmax) < m.
Theorem 1 captures the fundamental impact of availability of delayed CSIT from the legitimate receiver and
no eavesdropper CSIT. More specifically, by comparing SDoF of blind MIMOME wiretap channel with delayed
3This special case has also been independently studied in [22].
7Antenna Configuration Example Achieved SDoF in [20] SDoF
n1 ≤ nmax < m ≤ n1 + nmax m = 4, n1 = 2, nmax = 3, illustrated in Fig. 2 n1(m−nmax)m n1(m−nmax)m−nmax+n1
n1 ≤ nmax,m > n1 + nmax m = 3, n1 = 1, nmax = 2, illustrated in Fig. 3 n
2
1
n1+nmax
n1
2
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF ACHIEVABILITY RESULTS FOR 2 DIFFERENT CLASSES OF ANTENNA CONFIGURATION
Network
SDoF when
m ≤ max(n1, nmax)
SDoF when
max(n1, nmax) < m ≤ n1 + nmax
SDoF when
m > n1 + nmax
MIMOME WTP
with delayed CSIT
[m− nmax]+ n1m(m−nmax)n1nmax+m(m−nmax)
n1(n1+nmax)
n1+2nmax
Blind MIMOME WTP
with delayed CSIT
[m− nmax]+ n1(m−nmax)m−nmax+min(n1,nmax)
n21
n1+min(n1,nmax)
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF SDOF FOR TWO NETWORKS: MIMOME WIRETAP CHANNEL WITH DELAYED CSIT, AND BLIND MIMOME WIRETAP
CHANNEL WITH DELAYED CSIT
CSIT with that of MIMOME wiretap channel with delayed CSIT [20], as done in Table II, one can note that SDoF
strictly decreases when there is no eavesdropper CSIT available and max(n1, nmax) < m.
In the following sections we provide the proof for Theorem 1, and explain the key ideas behind the proof.
III. PROOF OF ACHIEVABILITY
In this section we present the achievable schemes for all antenna configurations. At a high level, our scheme
transmits two types of symbols: information symbols, which together constitute the confidential message, and
artificial noise symbols. By using an appropriate linear precoder and utilizing delayed CSIT supplied by the
legitimate receiver, we align artificial noise symbols into a smaller linear subspace at the legitimate receiver so
that some room is left for decoding information symbols, while allowing artificial noise to occupy the whole
received signal space at the eavesdroppers. This completely drowns information symbols in artificial noise at the
eavesdroppers so that eavesdroppers will not be able to decode them, while it allows the legitimate receiver to
successfully decode the information symbols.
8Throughout the presentation of the achievable schemes, for simplicity and without loss of generality we assume
that n = n′b, where b is the block length of communication for our scheme, and n′ is the number of blocks. In
fact, we repeat the same transmission scheme for all blocks. We first present the achievable scheme for the case
of m ≤ max(n1, nmax).4
A. Case of m ≤ max(n1, nmax)
Note that for the case where m ≤ nmax, Theorem 1 suggests that SDoF = 0; so there is nothing to prove
on the achievability side. Thus, let us consider the case where nmax < m ≤ n1. In this case we will show that
d = m−nmax secure degrees of freedom is achievable. In other words, we show how to securely deliver m−nmax
information symbols to Rx1 in each time slot (b = 1). In particular, in every time slot, each of the first nmax transmit
antennas sends a distinct artificial noise symbol, while each of the antennas with index nmax + 1, . . . ,m − 1,m
sends a distinct new information symbol. Consequently, Rx1 recovers all symbols almost surely, including the
m − nmax information symbols, since it receives n1 equations in m unknowns where m ≤ n1, hence satisfying
(3). By using an appropriate code for the Gaussian MIMO channel between Tx and Rx1, when the block length of
communication goes to infinity (i.e. n→∞), the error of communication goes to zero, satisfying (2).
Moreover, the eavesdroppers cannot decode any of the information symbols because Rxmax essentially receives
nmax equations regarding nmax artificial noise symbols (undesired symbols) and (m−nmax) information symbols.
Hence, the information symbols are completely drowned in artificial noise and Equivocation condition (4) is satisfied.
After providing the intuitive reason why the achievable scheme satisfies conditions (3)-(4), we now rigorously
prove that under the proposed scheme, conditions (3)-(4) are satisfied. To this aim, we state a lemma that will be
useful in the proof of achievability.
Lemma 1. For a fixed matrix A,
lim
p→∞
log det[I + pAAH ]
log p
= rank[A]. (6)
Proof of Lemma 1 follows from straightforward linear algebra and can be found in [20].
We first specify the transmit signals, and then use them to show that conditions (3)-(4) are satisfied. At time
slot t, ~unmax×1 ∈ CN (0, pmInmax) denotes the vector of artificial noise symbols, which are transmitted by antennas
1, . . . , nmax, and the vector of information symbols by ~v(m−nmax)×1 ∈ CN (0, pmI(m−nmax)), which are transmitted
by antennas nmax + 1, . . . ,m. As a result,
~x =

~unmax×1
~v(m−nmax)×1
 , K~x =
p
m
Im, K~x|~v =
p
m

Inmax 0
0 0
 . (7)
4The achievable scheme for the case m ≤ max(n1, nmax) is presented in [20]; however, we state it here for completion and because
its analysis serves as an introduction to analysis of the case m > max(n1, nmax).
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𝐓𝐱  
4 antennas 
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Fig. 2. The achievable scheme for a simple network configuration that belongs to case where n1 ≤ nmax,m ≥ n1 + nmax. The scheme
delivers 2 symbol securely over 3 time slots, achieving SDoF of 2
3
.
Therefore, for any j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k + 1},
lim
p→∞
I(~v; ~yj |G)
log p
= lim
p→∞EG{
h(~yj |G)− h(~yj |~v,G)
log p
} = lim
p→∞EG{
log det[I +GjK~xG
H
j ]− log det[I +GjK~x|~vGHj ]
log p
}
(a)
= EG{ lim
p→∞
log det[I +GjK~xG
H
j ]− log det[I +GjK~x|~vGHj ]
log p
}
= EG{ lim
p→∞
log det[I + pmGjG
H
j ]
log p
− lim
p→∞
log det[I + pmGj

Inmax 0
0 0(m−nmax)
G
H
j ]
log p
}
(Lemma 1)
= EG{rank[Gj ]− rank[Gj

Inmax 0
0 0(m−nmax)
]}, (8)
where (a) is due to Dominated Convergence Theorem. Furthermore, note that for a random channel realization G,
rank[Gj ]
a.s.
= min(nj ,m), rank[Gj

Inmax 0
0 0(m−nmax)
]
a.s.
= min(nj , nmax). (9)
Hence, since we are considering the case where nmax < m ≤ n1, by (8), (9), we obtain
lim
p→∞
I(~v; ~y1|G)
log p
= m− nmax, (10)
lim
p→∞
I(~v; ~yj |G)
log p
= 0, j = 2, . . . , k + 1, (11)
which prove that conditions (3),(4) are satisfied. Hence, the proposed achievable scheme achieves [m − nmax]+
secure degrees of freedom when m ≤ max(n1, nmax).
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B. Case of m > max(n1, nmax)
In this case the scheme will securely deliver n1(m¯− nmax) information symbols over m¯− nmax + n¯ time slots
(b = m¯ − nmax + n¯). The scheme is presented in two phases. The first phase takes n¯ time slots, during which
only artificial noise symbols are transmitted. Then, during the second phase, which takes m¯ − nmax time slots,
some of artificial noise equations are retransmitted together with information symbols in such a way that they
completely mask the information symbols at the eavesdroppers, while the information symbols can be recovered at
the legitimate receiver. Since throughout the description of our achievable scheme and its analysis only m¯ transmit
antennas are used at any point in time, we only focus on the first m¯ transmit antennas for the sake of simplicity and
ignore the rest. Further, we implicitly consider the proper scaling which is needed to satisfy the power constraint.
We now present the details of our scheme.
Phase 1: This phase takes n¯ time slots. At t = 1, 2, . . . , n¯, each of the m¯ transmit antennas sends a new artificial
noise symbol. Thus, since channel coefficients are i.i.d. and drawn from a continuous distribution, what Rx1 receives
on its first (m¯−nmax) antennas are almost surely linearly independent of equations received by antennas of Rxmax,
hence not recoverable by Rxmax. Similar result holds for other eavesdroppers. Hence, by the end of phase 1, Rx1
obtains n¯(m¯− nmax) linearly independent noise equations that are not recoverable by eavesdroppers.
Phase 2: This phase takes m¯ − nmax time slots. In each time slot t ∈ {n¯ + 1, . . . , m¯ − nmax + n¯}, transmit
signals by the m¯ transmit antennas are as follows:
~x(t) =

~u′¯n(t)
~0m¯−n¯
+

~vn1(t)
~0m¯−n1
 , (12)
where ~u′¯n(t) is a vector comprised of n¯ linearly independent artificial noise equations known by Rx1 (ignoring
AWGN), which are not recoverable by eavesdroppers, and are produced as the result of Phase 1 of the scheme.
Note that these artificial noise equations are known to the transmitter by the end of Phase 1 because it has access
to delayed CSIT of the legitimate receiver as well as all artificial noise symbols. We will refer to these artificial
noise equations as artificial noise symbols for simplicity. Moreover, ~vn1(t)is the vector of information symbols.
As a result of this transmission scheme, in each time slot of Phase 2, Rx1 cancels the transmitted artificial
noise symbols from its received signal, and recovers the n1 desirable information symbols. Therefore, Rx1 recovers
n1(m¯− nmax) information symbols in total, satisfying (3).
In order to explain why Equivocation condition (4) is satisfied , we focus on Rxmax as the argument is similar
for other eavesdroppers. We consider the two antenna configurations n¯ = n1 ≤ nmax, and n¯ = nmax ≤ n1. In the
case of n¯ = n1 ≤ nmax, each active antenna is sending one information symbol plus an artificial noise symbol
which is not known to Rxmax. Therefore, Rxmax cannot recover any of the information symbols. Moreover, in the
case of n¯ = nmax ≤ n1, the transmitter is sending nmax artificial noise symbols in each time slot which are not
11
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Fig. 3. The achievable scheme for a simple network configuration that belongs to case where n1 ≤ nmax,m ≥ n1 + nmax. The scheme
delivers 1 symbol securely over 2 timeslots, achieving SDoF of 1
2
.
known to Rxmax. Thus, since Rxmax has nmax antennas, the transmitted artificial noise symbols span the entire
space of received signals at Rxmax and do not allow for any information symbol to be recovered, satisfying (4).
Hence, overall n1(m¯−nmax) information symbols are delivered securely to Rx1 over m¯−nmax + n¯ time slots,
and the scheme achieves n1(m¯−nmax)m¯−nmax+n¯ secure degrees of freedom. Thus, the proposed achievable scheme strictly
improves the existing achievable schemes [20] for the case n1 < nmax < m ≤ n1 + nmax, illustrated in Figure 2,
and m ≥ n1 + nmax, where nmax > n1, as illustrated in Figure 3.
After explaining why the proposed achievable scheme achieves n1(m¯−nmax)m¯−nmax+n¯ secure degrees of freedom, we now
prove that the conditions (3),(4) are indeed satisfied. Let ~u ∼ CN (0, pm¯In¯m¯), ~v ∼ CN (0, pm¯In1(m¯−nmax)). The
transmit signal is as follows:
~xm¯−nmax+n¯ =

In¯m¯ 0n¯m¯×n1(m¯−nmax)
A Im¯−nmax ⊗

In1 0
0 0m¯−n1



~u
~v
 , (13)
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where
A ,

A(n¯+ 1)
...
A(m¯− nmax + n¯)

, and A(t) ,

~g1,t−n¯(1) 0 . . . 0
0 ~g1,t−n¯(2) . . . 0
...
. . .
...
0 . . . 0 ~g1,t−n¯(n¯)
0(m¯−n¯)×n¯m¯

, (14)
where ~g1,i(t) is the channel vector comprised of coefficients of channels between transmitter and the i-th receive
antenna of Rx1 at time t . Hence, the received signal at Rxj (j = 1, . . . , k + 1) is
~ym¯−nmax+n¯j =

Gn¯j 0n¯nj×n1(m¯−nmax)
Gn¯+1:m¯−nmax+n¯j A G
n¯+1:m¯−nmax+n¯
j Im¯−nmax ⊗

In1 0
0 0m¯−n1



~u
~v
+ ~z
m¯−nmax+n¯
j . (15)
We now show that (3)-(4) are satisfied. Using similar steps as in (8), we obtain
lim
p→∞
I(~v; ~ym¯−nmax+n¯j )
log p
= EGm¯−nmax+n¯{rank

Gn¯j 0n¯nj×n1(m¯−nmax)
Gn¯+1:m¯−nmax+n¯j A G
n¯+1:m¯−nmax+n¯
j Im¯−nmax ⊗

In1 0
0 0m¯−n1


}
− EGm¯−nmax+n¯{rank

Gn¯j
Gn¯+1:m¯−nmax+n¯j A
}. (16)
Due to the structure of A,
rank

Gn¯j
Gn¯+1:m¯−nmax+n¯j A

a.s.
=
{ rank[Gn¯j ], for j = 1
rank[Gn¯j ] + rank[G
n¯+1:m¯−nmax+n¯
j A], for j > 1
(17)
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and
rank

Gn¯j 0n¯nj×n1(m¯−nmax)
Gn¯+1:m¯−nmax+n¯j A G
n¯+1:m¯−nmax+n¯
j Im¯−nmax ⊗

In1 0
0 0m¯−n1


a.s.
=
{ rank[Gn¯j ] + rank
G
n¯+1:m¯−nmax+n¯
j Im¯−nmax ⊗

In1 0
0 0m¯−n1

, for j = 1
rank[Gn¯j ] + rank[G
n¯+1:m¯−nmax+n¯
j A], for j > 1
a.s.
=
{ rank[Gn¯j ] + n1(m¯− nmax), for j = 1
rank[Gn¯j ] + rank[G
n¯+1:m¯−nmax+n¯
j A], for j > 1.
(18)
Using (16)-(18), one can readily see that conditions (3)-(4) are satisfied. Hence, the proposed achievable scheme
achieves n1(m¯−nmax)m¯−nmax+n¯ secure degrees of freedom when m > max(n1, nmax); and thus, achievability proof is
complete.
IV. PROOF OF CONVERSE FOR THEOREM 1
In this section we present the converse proof for Theorem 1. Note that for any antenna configuration (m,n1, n2,
. . . , nk+1), if some of the eavesdroppers are removed from the network, SDoF will not decrease; and this is due
to removing some of the Equivocation constraints on maximizing the secure rate. Hence, to prove the converse we
first remove all the eavesdroppers except Rxmax from the network. We start by proving the converse for the case
where m ≤ max(n1, nmax).5
A. Proof of Converse for m ≤ max(n1, nmax)
We first state a lemma that will be used throughout this section.
Lemma 2. Consider two receivers Rx1,Rx2 with n1, n2 antennas, where Rx2 supplies delayed CSIT or no CSIT.
For any fixed n, and any encoding strategy f (n),
h(~yn2 |Gn)
min(m,n2)
+ n× o(log p) ≥ h(~y
n
1 , ~y
n
2 |Gn)
min(m,n1 + n2)
.
5Proof of converse for the case when m ≤ max(n1, nmax) has been presented in [20]; nevertheless, we provide the proof here for
completion.
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Lemma 2 provides a lower bound on the received signal dimension at a receiver which does not supply perfect
CSIT. In other words, it relates the received signal dimension of a receiver which supplies delayed or no CSIT to
that of another receiver. Proof of Lemma 2 follows from channel symmetry; and it can be found in [20], [27].
We now prove the converse for m ≤ max(n1, nmax). Suppose d secure DoF is achievable. Therefore, by Fano’s
inequality,
n(R− n) ≤I(W ; ~yn1 |Gn) ≤ I(W ; ~yn1 , ~ynmax|Gn)
(a)
≤ h(~yn1 , ~ynmax|Gn)− h(~ynmax|W,Gn)
= h(~yn1 , ~y
n
max|Gn)− h(~ynmax|Gn) + I(W ; ~ynmax|Gn)
(4)
≤ h(~yn1 , ~ynmax|Gn)− h(~ynmax|Gn) + n× o(log p)
(Lemma 2)
≤
m−min(m,nmax)
min(m,nmax)
× h(~ynmax|Gn) + n× o(log p)
=
[m− nmax]+
nmax
× h(~ynmax|Gn) + n× o(log p)
≤ [m− nmax]
+
nmax
× nnmax log p+ n× o(log p)
= [m− nmax]+ × n log p+ n× o(log p),
where (a) holds since h(~yn1 |~ynmax,W,Gn) ≥ h(~yn1 |~xn, ~ynmax,W,Gn) = h(~zn1 ) > 0. Hence, by dividing both sides of
the above inequality by n log p and taking the limit n→∞ and p→∞, the result follows.
B. Proof of Converse for m > max(n1, nmax)
Before presenting the converse proof for m > max(n1, nmax), we consider a notation that will be used throughout
the proof. Let Rxmax,1 denote the first n¯ antennas on Rxmax with the corresponding received signal of ~ynmax,1 over n
time slots. Further, let Rxmax,2 denote the remaining nmax− n¯ antennas on Rxmax with the corresponding received
signal of ~ynmax,2. Finally, we denote by Rx1,1 the first m¯− nmax antennas on Rx1 with the corresponding received
signal of ~yn1,1.
We first present the tools that are used to prove the converse for this case. The first lemma, Least Alignment
Lemma, implies that once the transmitter(s) in a network has no CSIT with respect to a certain receiver, the least
amount of alignment will occur at that receiver, meaning that transmit signals will occupy the maximal signal
dimensions at that receiver. As a result, for the specific case of having two n0-antenna receivers Rx1,Rx2, if the
transmitter does not have access to any CSIT with respect to Rx2, then the received signal dimension at Rx2 will
be greater than Rx1.
Lemma 3. (Least Alignment Lemma) Consider two receivers Rx1,Rx2 with n0 antennas, where Rx2 supplies no
CSIT. Then, for a given n ∈ N and any encoding strategy f (n) as defined in Definition 1,
h(~yn1 |Gn) ≤ h(~yn2 |Gn) + n× o(log p).
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Remark 2. Lemma 3 holds irrespective of the type of CSIT supplied by Rx1. Furthermore, Lemma 3 holds for
arbitrary number of transmitters with arbitrary number of transmit antennas; this can be shown via following the
same steps as in the proof presented in Appendix A. Therefore, Least Alignment Lemma is a general inequality that
can be applied to lower bound the received signal dimension at any receiver which supplies no CSIT. In fact, Least
Alignment Lemma relates the received signal dimension at a receiver which supplies no CSIT to the dimension at
other receivers with the same number of antennas, and as a result, proves to be an important tool in analyzing
networks with heterogeneous CSIT, where some receivers supply no CSIT, while others supply some form of CSIT
to the transmitter(s).
[1] provided a proof of the lemma for single-antenna receivers, which was limited to networks whose trans-
mitter(s) were only able to employ linear encoding schemes.6 However, Davoodi and Jafar [23] provided the first
proof of the inequality in Lemma 3 (for single-antenna receivers) under general encoding schemes. Their proof
was based on a novel analysis of the Aligned Image Sets at receivers which supply imperfect CSIT. The proof was
used to settle important conjectures regarding networks with imperfect CSIT [23]. Proof of Lemma 3, presented in
Appendix A, extends the result to the MIMO setting.
The following lemma relates the received signal dimensions at 2 receivers supplying no CSIT.
Lemma 4. Consider receivers Rx1,Rx2 which supply no CSIT, with n1, n2 antennas, where n1 ≥ n2. Then, for a
given n ∈ N and any encoding strategy f (n) as defined in Definition 1,
h(~yn1 |Gn)
min(m,n1)
≤ h(~y
n
2 |Gn)
min(m,n2)
+ n× o(log p).
Proof of Lemma 4 follows from channel symmetry, and can be found in prior works, including [28].
Proposition 1. If m > max(n1, nmax), then,
h(~yn1 |Gn) ≤
n1
n¯
h(~ynmax,1|Gn) + n× o(log p).
Proof of Proposition 1 follows from Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, and is postponed to Appendix B.
Finally, the following lemma, provides a lower bound on the dimension of joint received signals at a collection
of receivers, where some receivers supply no CSIT.
Lemma 5. Consider receivers Rx1,Rx2,Rx3 with n1, n2, n3 antennas, where n1, n2, n3 > 0, and m ≥ n1+n2+n3.
Further, suppose that Rx2,Rx3 supply no CSIT. Then, for a given n ∈ N and any encoding strategy f (n) as defined
in Definition 1,
h(~yn1 |~yn2 , ~yn3 ,Gn)
n1
≤ h(~y
n
2 |~yn3 ,Gn)
n2
+ n× o(log p).
Lemma 5 is proved in Appendix C.
6Extension of the proof to networks with multiple antenna receivers appeared in [2].
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Proposition 2. If n1 < nmax < m, for a given n ∈ N and any encoding strategy f (n) as defined in Definition 1,
h(~yn1,1|~ynmax,Gn)
m¯− nmax ≤
h(~ynmax,2|~ynmax,1,Gn)
nmax − n¯ + n× o(log p).
Proof of Proposition 2 follows immediately from substituting (~yn1 , ~y
n
2 , ~y
n
3 ) by (~y
n
1,1, ~y
n
max,2, ~y
n
max,1) in the statement
of Lemma 5.
We now prove the converse for the case where m > max(n1, nmax). Throughout the proof, we use the notation
h(∅|Gn) = 0 for convenience. Suppose d secure degrees of freedom is achievable. By Fano’s inequality,
n(R− n) ≤ I(W ; ~yn1 |Gn) ≤ h(~yn1 |Gn)− h(~yn1 |W,Gn)
(Lemma 2)
≤ h(~y
n
1 |Gn)−
n1
m¯
h(~ynmax|W,Gn)
= h(~yn1 |Gn) +
n1
m¯
I(W ; ~ynmax|Gn)−
n1
m¯
h(~ynmax|Gn)
(4)
≤ h(~yn1 |Gn)−
n1
m¯
h(~ynmax|Gn) + n.o(log p)
(Proposition 1)
≤ n1
n¯
h(~ynmax,1|Gn)−
n1
m¯
h(~ynmax|Gn) + n.o(log p)
= n1(
m¯− n¯
m¯n¯
)h(~ynmax,1|Gn)−
n1
m¯
h(~ynmax,2|~ynmax,1,Gn) + n.o(log p)
≤ n1(m¯− n¯
m¯
)n log p− n1
m¯
h(~ynmax,2|~ynmax,1,Gn) + n.o(log p). (19)
We now study the two cases nmax ≤ n1, and nmax > n1. If nmax ≤ n1, then n1m¯ h(~ynmax,2|~ynmax,1,Gn), which is
the second term on the RHS of (19) will equal zero since Rxmax,2 is an empty set of antennas when nmax ≤ n1.
As a result, since n¯ = nmax,
n(R− n) ≤ n1( m¯− nmax
m¯− nmax + n¯)n log p+ n.o(log p),
where by dividing both sides of the inequality by n log p and taking the limit n→∞, p→∞, the converse proof
is obtained for the case where nmax ≤ n1.
We now consider the case where nmax > n1. For this case we derive a second bound on the secure rate, and
then merge it with (19) to obtain the converse proof. Again, by Fano’s inequality we obtain
n(R− n) ≤ I(W ; ~yn1 |Gn) ≤ I(W ; ~yn1 , ~ynmax|Gn) ≤ h(~yn1 , ~ynmax|Gn)− h(~ynmax|W,Gn)
(4)
= h(~yn1 , ~y
n
max|Gn)− h(~ynmax|Gn) + n.o(log p)
(a)
= h(~yn1,1, ~y
n
max|Gn)− h(~ynmax|Gn) + n.o(log p) = h(~yn1,1|~ynmax,Gn) + n.o(log p)
(Proposition 2)
≤ (m¯− nmax
nmax − n¯ )h(~y
n
max,2|~ynmax,1,Gn) + n.o(log p), (20)
where (a) holds since either m > n1 +nmax, in which case the equality is obvious as ~yn1,1 = ~y
n
1 , or m ≤ n1 +nmax,
in which case given (~yn1,1, ~y
n
max,Gn), one can reconstruct the transmit signals within noise level; and as a result,
h(~yn1 |~yn1,1, ~ynmax,Gn) = n.o(log p).
We now linearly combine the two inequalities (19), (20) and use the fact that n¯ = n1 in this case. By multiplying
both sides of (19) by m¯(m¯−nmax)(m¯−n¯)(m¯−nmax+n¯) , and multiplying both sides of (20) by
n1(nmax−n¯)
(m¯−n¯)(m¯−nmax+n¯) , and then adding
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the two inequalities together, we obtain the following inequality by considering the assumption that n¯ = n1:
n(R− n) ≤ n1(m¯− nmax)
m¯− nmax + n¯n log p+ n.o(log p),
where by dividing both sides of the inequality by n log p and taking the limit n→∞, p→∞, the converse proof
is obtained for the case where nmax > n1. Hence, the proof of converse is complete.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we considered the wiretap channel consisting of a legitimate receiver and arbitrary number of
eavesdroppers, with delayed CSIT supplied by the legitimate receiver to the transmitter and no eavesdroppers
CSIT. All nodes in the network are equipped with arbitrary number of antennas, hence the name blind MIMOME
wiretap channel with delayed CSIT. We completely characterized the secure Degrees of Freedom (SDoF) for all
antenna configurations.
In order to improve the existing achievable scheme we proposed a two-phase scheme where in the first phase
artificial noise symbols are transmitted; and in the second phase some of the received noise equations in the first
phase are retransmitted together with information symbols in order to drown the information symbols in noise at
the eavesdroppers, while the legitimate receiver can decode all the information symbols. The signaling makes use of
delayed CSIT supplied by the legitimate receiver, and is accomplished in such a way that allows for better artificial
noise alignment at the eavesdroppers. The converse proof is based on several inequalities useful for lower bounding
the received signal dimension at receivers with delayed CSIT, or no CSIT, or joint received signal dimension at
collections of receivers where some supply no CSIT.
An interesting future direction is to study the impact of cooperative jamming on the achievable SDoF of blind
MIMOME wiretap channel with delayed CSIT, where a jammer is basically a transmitter that does not necessarily
have access to the confidential message, but can help jam the confidential message at the eavesdropper(s), hence
increase the achievable SDoF. An initial step towards this direction has been taken in [1], which studies Blind SISO
wiretap channel with cooperative jammer and delayed CSIT. Another potential follow-up direction to our work in
this paper is to consider noisy and delayed CSIT supplied by the legitimate receiver, rather than perfect and delayed
CSIT, and study how this impacts the achievable SDoF.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEAST ALIGNMENT LEMMA (LEMMA 3)
We first restate Lemma 3 here.
Lemma 3 (Least Alignment Lemma). Consider two receivers Rx1,Rx2 with n0 antennas, where Rx2 supplies no
CSIT. Then, for a given n ∈ N and any encoding strategy f (n) as defined in Definition 1,
h(~yn1 |Gn) ≤ h(~yn2 |Gn) + n.o(log p).
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We prove a stronger version of Lemma 3. More specifically, we prove that if Tx only knows a probability
distribution for values of the channels to Rx2, and we denote the maximum value of such distribution by fmax(p),
then
h(~yn1 |Gn) ≤ h(~yn2 |Gn) + nn0 log(fmax(p)) + n.o(log p).
In order to prove the above inequality, we use the approach in [23] to generalize that result to the MIMO case. In
particular, we first transform the network via a deterministic channel model.
A. Deterministic Channel Model
To prove the lemma, we first discretize the channel to avoid dealing with the impact of additive Gaussian noise.
This leads to a deterministic channel model described as follows. For j = 1, 2, let
~¯x(t) =

x¯1(t)
...
x¯m(t)

, ~¯yj(t) =

y¯j,{1}(t)
...
y¯j,{n0}(t)

, Gj(t) =

gj,{1,1}(t) . . . gj,{1,m}(t)
...
gj,{n0,1}(t) . . . gj,{n0,m}(t)

. (21)
The channel input at time t is denoted by ~¯x(t), where ~¯x(t) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d√pe}m . The channel outputs are
defined as
~¯yj(t) =

y¯j,{1}(t)
...
y¯j,{n0}(t)

=

∑m
i=1bgj,{1,i}(t)x¯i(t)c
...
∑m
i=1bgj,{n0,i}(t)x¯i(t)c

. (22)
Lemma 6.
max lim
p→∞
h(~yn1 |Gn)− h(~yn2 |Gn)
log p
≤ max lim
p→∞
H(~¯yn1 |Gn)−H(~¯yn2 |Gn)
log p
, (23)
where the maximum on the left hand side is taken over all possible encoding strategies as defined in Definition 1;
and the maximum on the right hand side is taken over all possible encoding schemes for the deterministic channel.
Proof of Lemma 6 follows from similar arguments used to prove that DoF of a network under deterministic
channel model is an upper bound on the actual DoF. The proof can be found in prior works, including [23], [29],
and hence is omitted for brevity. Lemma 6 suggests that for proving Lemma 3, it is sufficient to prove that under
deterministic channel model,
H(~¯yn1 |Gn)−H(~¯yn2 |Gn) ≤ n.o(log p). (24)
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As a result, our objective henceforth will be to prove (24).
B. Imposing Functional Dependence
We will show in this section that by imposing functional dependence of ~¯xn on (~¯yn1 , G
n
1 ), we obtain an upper
bound on H(~¯yn1 |Gn)−H(~¯yn2 |Gn). Define L as the mapping from (~¯yn1 , Gn1 ) to ~¯xn:
~¯xn = L(~¯yn1 , Gn1 ). (25)
This mapping is in general stochastic, and therefore, L is a random variable. Hence, by conditioning on L we
obtain
H(~¯yn2 |Gn) ≥ H(~¯yn2 |Gn,L) ≥ min
L
H(~¯yn2 |Gn,L = L) = H(~¯yn2 |Gn,L = L0), (26)
where7 L0 , arg minLH(~¯yn2 |Gn,L = L) is a deterministic map. Note that the choice of map does not impact
(~¯yn1 ,Gn). Hence, using (26) we obtain
H(~¯yn1 |Gn)−H(~¯yn2 |Gn) ≤ H(~¯yn1 |Gn,L = L0)−H(~¯yn2 |Gn,L = L0). (27)
Thus, henceforth, we will upper bound (27) in order to complete the proof of Lemma 3; and we will assume that
~¯xn = L0(~¯y
n
1 , G
n
1 ). (28)
Note that the above equation suggests that ~¯yn2 is fully specified by (~¯y
n
1 ,Gn); hence, we use the following notation
for simplicity:
~¯yn2 (~¯y
n
1 ,Gn) ,

∑m
i=1bg2,{1,i}(t)L0(~¯yn1 , Gn1 )i(t)c
...
∑m
i=1bg2,{n0,i}(t)L0(~¯yn1 , Gn1 )i(t)c

, (29)
where L0(~¯yn1 , G
n
1 ) = ~¯x
n, and L0(~¯yn1 , G
n
1 )i(t) = x¯i(t), which is the i-th element of the vector ~¯x(t).
C. Upper Bounding H(~¯yn1 |Gn)−H(~¯yn2 |Gn) via Aligned Image Sets
Note that our goal is to upper bound H(~¯yn1 |Gn) −H(~¯yn2 |Gn). This means that we will try to upper bound the
difference between received signal dimensions at Rx1,Rx2. This difference grows when more codewords that are
received at Rx1 as different received codewords align perfectly at Rx2; because in such case, the dimension of
received signal at Rx2 will decrease, leading to an increase in the difference of received signal dimensions at the two
receivers. Hence, we will focus on aligned images sets, which are sets of distinct codewords received at Rx1 that
7In cases where arg minLH(~¯yn2 |Gn,L = L) is not unique, we choose L0 to be a deterministic mapping that minimizes H(~¯yn2 |Gn,L =
L).
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are aligned at Rx2. More specifically, for a pair (~¯vn,Gn) of received codeword at Rx2, ~¯vn, and channel coefficients,
Gn, we define the corresponding aligned image set as the set of all received signals at Rx1 which have the same
image at Rx2 as ~¯vn.
Definition 3. (Aligned Image Set) S~¯vn(Gn) ,
{
~¯yn1 | ~¯yn2 (~¯yn1 ,Gn) = ~¯vn, t = 1, . . . , n
}
.
We now upper bound H(~¯yn1 |Gn)−H(~¯yn2 |Gn) via analyzing the cardinality of aligned image sets.
H(~¯yn1 |Gn)−H(~¯yn2 |Gn) ≤ H(~¯yn1 , ~¯yn2 |Gn, L0)−H(~¯yn2 |Gn, L0) = H(~¯yn1 |~¯yn2 ,Gn, L0)
(a)
= H(~¯yn1 | |S~¯yn2 (Gn)|, ~¯yn2 ,Gn, L0)
(b)
≤ E log |S~¯yn2 (Gn)|
(c)
≤ logE|S~¯yn2 (Gn)|, (30)
where (a) holds since (~¯yn2 ,Gn, L0) completely determines the aligned image set S~¯yn2 (Gn); (b) holds since the entropy
of ~¯yn1 is maximized when it has a uniform distribution over all of its possible values, which are determined by
S~¯yn2 (Gn); and (c) holds due to Jensen’s inequality.
Hence, we will focus on upper bounding E|S~¯yn2 (Gn)|. To this aim, for a given (~¯yn1 , ~¯vn) we first analyze Pr(~¯yn1 ∈
S~¯vn(Gn)), which is the probability that the received image of a certain codeword at Rx1 has the same image at
Rx2 as ~¯vn.
D. Bounding the probability of Image Alignment
In this section we will provide an upper bound on Pr(~¯yn1 ∈ S~¯vn(Gn)). To this aim, we analyze Pr(~¯yn1 ∈
S~¯vn(Gn)|Gn1 ). Let us fix ~¯yn1 , ~¯vn, Gn1 . Note that given (~¯yn1 , Gn1 ), ~¯xn is determined. Consider the event where ~¯yn1 ∈
S~¯vn(Gn). This event is equivalent to ~¯yn2 (~¯yn1 ,Gn) = ~¯vn, which in turn by (29) is equivalent to the following:
∀t = 1, . . . , n,

∑m
i=1bg2,{1,i}(t)L0(~¯yn1 , Gn1 )i(t)c
...
∑m
i=1bg2,{n0,i}(t)L0(~¯yn1 , Gn1 )i(t)c

= ~¯v(t) =

v¯1(t)
...
v¯n0(t)

, (31)
or equivalently,
∀t = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , n0,
m∑
i=1
bg2,{j,i}(t)x¯i(t)c = v¯j(t). (32)
Let i∗(t) = arg maxi x¯i(t). As a result, the above event can be re-written as follows:
∀t = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , n0,
v¯j(t)−
m∑
i=1,i 6=i∗(t)
bg2,{j,i}(t)x¯i(t)c ≤ g2,{j,i∗(t)}(t)x¯i∗(t)(t) ≤ v¯j(t)−
m∑
i=1,i 6=i∗(t)
bg2,{j,i}(t)x¯i(t)c+ 1.
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Hence, for every t, if x¯i∗(t)(t) 6= 0, then for the event (32) to occur it is necessary that g2,{j,i∗(t)}(t) fall in an
interval of length 1x¯i∗(t)(t) for t = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , n. Also, note that if ~¯x(t) =
~0 (which means x¯i∗(t)(t) = 0),
then ~¯y1(t) = ~¯y2(t) = ~0. Hence, for all t = 1, . . . , n, where ~¯y1(t) 6= ~0, the probability of occurrence of (32) for
t = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , n0, is at most fmax(p)( 1x¯i∗(t)(t)). We now further upper bound this quantity. Note that since
y¯1,{j}(t) =
∑m
i=1bg1,{j,i}(t)x¯i(t)c,
|y¯1,{j}(t)| ≤ x¯i∗(t)(t)
m∑
i=1
|g1,{j,i}(t)|+m.
By re-writing the above inequality, when |y¯1,{j}(t)| > m,
1
x¯i∗(t)(t)
≤
∑m
i=1 |g1,{j,i}(t)|
|y¯1,{j}(t)| −m
.
Hence, we have the following upper bound on the probability of occurrence of ~¯yn1 ∈ S~¯vn(Gn):
Pr(~¯yn1 ∈ S~¯vn(Gn)|Gn1 ) ≤
∏
t:
~¯y1(t)6=~0
∏
j:
|y¯1,{j}(t)|>m
fmax(p)(
∑m
i=1 |g1,{j,i}(t)|)
|y¯1,{j}(t)| −m
≤
 n∏
t=1
n∏
j=1
max(1, fmax(p)(
m∑
i=1
|g1,{j,i}(t)|))
 n∏
t=1
n∏
j=1
1
max(1, |y¯1,{j}(t)| −m)
≤ max(1, fmax(p)mdmax)nn0
n∏
t=1
n∏
j=1
1
max(1, |y¯1,{j}(t)| −m)
. (33)
We use the above bound on Pr(~¯yn1 ∈ S~¯vn(Gn)|Gn1 ) to further upper bound (30).
E. Bounding the Average Size of Aligned Image Sets
For a given ~¯vn,
E[S~¯vn(Gn)] = E[E[S~¯vn(Gn)|Gn1 ]] = E[
∑
~¯yn1
Pr(~¯yn1 ∈ S~¯vn(Gn)|Gn1 )]
(33)
≤ max(1, fmax(p)mdmax)nn0
∑
~¯yn1
n∏
t=1
n∏
j=1
1
max(1, |y¯1,{j}(t)| −m)
(a)
= max(1, fmax(p)mdmax)
nn0
n∏
t=1
n∏
j=1
∑
y¯1,{j}(t)
1
max(1, |y¯1,{j}(t)| −m)
(b)
≤ max(1, fmax(p)mdmax)nn0
n∏
t=1
n∏
j=1
{
∑
y¯1,{j}(t):
|y¯1,{j}(t)|≤m
1 +
∑
y¯1,{j}(t):
m<|y¯1,{j}(t)|≤q
1
|y¯1,{j}(t)| −m
}
≤ max(1, fmax(p)mdmax)nn0
n∏
t=1
n∏
j=1
{log q + o(log q)}
≤ max(1, fmax(p)mdmax)nn0(log q)nn0 + o(log q)
≤ max(1, fmax(p)mdmax)nn0(log√p)nn0 + o(log p), (34)
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where (a) follows from interchanging sum and product; and (b) follows from the definition q , mdmax
√
p + m,
and noting that |y¯1,{j}(t)| ≤ q. Hence, by (30) and (34), we obtain
H(~¯yn1 |Gn)−H(~¯yn2 |Gn) ≤ log (max(1, fmax(p)mdmax)nn0(log
√
p)nn0 + o(log p))
= nn0 log(fmax(p)) + o(log p). (35)
Therefore, the proof of Lemma 3 is complete.
Remark 3. Note that (35) in fact proves a stronger statement than Lemma 3. In particular, for any CSIT quality
supplied by Rx2 as a function of power fmax(p), (35) implies that
h(~yn1 |Gn) ≤ h(~yn2 |Gn) + nn0 log(fmax(p)) + n.o(log p).
Nevertheless, in order to prove Theorem 1, it was sufficient to consider the special case where fmax(p) = o(log p),
which is the case in the statement of Lemma 3.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Let us first consider a hypothetical receiver Rx0 with n1 antennas for which there is no CSIT available to the
transmitter. Hence, by Lemma 3,
h(~yn1 |Gn) ≤ h(~yn0 |Gn) + n.o(log p). (36)
Moreover, since n1 ≥ n¯ and there is no CSIT with respect to any of Rx0,Rxmax,1, using Lemma 4,
h(~yn0 |Gn)
n1
≤ h(~y
n
max,1|Gn)
n¯
+ n.o(log p). (37)
Therefore, by combining the inequalities in (36)-(37) we get
h(~yn1 |Gn) ≤
n1
n¯
h(~ynmax,1|Gn) + n.o(log p),
which completes the proof of Proposition 1.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
We first state an extension of Lemma 4, which is useful in proving Lemma 5, and can be proved using the same
proof steps as in proof of Lemma 4.
Lemma 7. Consider receivers Rx1,Rx2,Rx3 which supply no CSIT, with n1, n2, n3 antennas, where n1 ≥ n2.
Then, for a given n ∈ N and any encoding strategy f (n) as defined in Definition 1,
h(~yn1 |~yn3 ,Gn)
min(m,n1)
≤ h(~y
n
2 |~yn3 ,Gn)
min(m,n2)
+ n× o(log p).
Consider receivers Rx1,Rx2,Rx3 with n1, n2, n3 antennas, where n1, n2, n3 > 0, and m ≥ n1 + n2 + n3. Also,
suppose that Rx2,Rx3 supply no CSIT. Further, let Rx0 denote a receiver with n1 antennas supplying no CSIT.
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n2 × h(~yn1 |~yn2 , ~yn3 ,Gn) = n2 × h(~yn1 , ~yn2 , ~yn3 |Gn)− n2 × h(~yn3 |Gn)− n2 × h(~yn2 |~yn3 ,Gn)
(a)
≤ n2 × h(~yn0 , ~yn2 , ~yn3 |Gn)− n2 × h(~yn3 |Gn)− n2 × h(~yn2 |~yn3 ,Gn) + n.o(log p)
= n2 × h(~yn0 , ~yn2 |~yn3 ,Gn)− n2 × h(~yn2 |~yn3 ,Gn) + n.o(log p)
Lemma 7≤ n2 × (n1 + n2
n2
)× h(~yn2 |~yn3 ,Gn)− n2 × h(~yn2 |~yn3 ,Gn) + n.o(log p)
≤ n1 × h(~yn2 |~yn3 ,Gn) + n.o(log p), (38)
where (a) holds since the virtual receiver incorporating (Rx0,Rx2,Rx3), which has n1+n2+n3 antennas, supplies no
CSIT; and as a result, we can apply Lemma 3 to lower bound h(~yn0 , ~y
n
2 , ~y
n
3 |Gn) by h(~yn1 , ~yn2 , ~yn3 |Gn). By rearranging
both sides of (38), proof of Lemma 5 will be complete.
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